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This paper explores the relationship between the presence of employee involvement workplace prac-
tices and wage dispersion within ﬁrms. Using the representative sample of US establishments from the
National Employer Survey conducted in 1994 and 1997, the paper explores the links between employee
involvement workplace practices adoption and intensity of use (measured by the percentage of a ﬁrm’s
workers who operate under a given practice) and wage inequality within companies using OLS as well
as quantile regressions.
The results suggest that adoption of employee involvement workplace practices is associated with
greater wage dispersion. Compared to establishments not using any of the involvement practices, ﬁrms
that adopt a partial system or full system of practices, including regular problem-solving meetings
and/or self-managed team and/or job rotation, have signiﬁcantly greater wage dispersion. On the
other hand, ﬁrms that complement the practices with training for production workers (on teamwork or
problem-solving meetings) have lower dispersion than those who do not complement with training. The
results based on employee involvement intensity of use show evidence of compression eﬀects associated
with self-managed teamwork in the manufacturing sector at the 25th percentile or for low wage dispersion
ﬁrms. There is also evidence of wage compression eﬀects associated with problem-solving meetings in
the non manufacturing sector for high wage dispersion ﬁrms.1 Introduction
Starting in the 1980s, there has been an increasing interest in the use of what have commonly been
called “innovative” or “high- performance” workplace practices in the United States. The interest grew
mainly after observing the success of Japanese ﬁrms using management practices such as Total Quality
Management (TQM), self-managed teams and job rotation. With the recent availability of plant-level
data on human resources and workplace organization practices, researchers have found evidence that
these practices deserve their label “high-performance” in that they appear to increase ﬁrm performance. 1
Although improvement in ﬁrm productivity has been the main focus of analysis, a related aspect
concerns the eﬀect of these workplace practices on wage outcomes. In particular, practices such as
problem-solving meetings, self-managed teamwork or job rotation, which are aimed at increasing em-
ployee involvement in the ﬁrm’s production and business objectives, have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the
responsibilities of workers at the lower end of the ﬁrm’s job ladder. This leads to the following some-
what overlooked questions: What is the relationship between employee involvement workplace practices
and within-ﬁrm wage dispersion? Is wage dispersion aﬀected by adoption of such practices? Does the
intensity with which the practices are used (measured by the ﬁrm’s percentage of workers under the
given practice) aﬀect wage dispersion?
This paper explores the relationship between employee involvement workplace practice adoption and
wage dispersion within ﬁrms using data from the National Employer Survey (NES), which consists of
two nationally representative samples of U.S. private establishments interviewed in 1993 and 1996. I
analyze the impact of adopting these employee involvement workplace practices on the ratio of average
wages of managerial workers to those of production workers. I also examine the robustness of this
relationship to alternate deﬁnitions of adoption. Importantly, following recent theoretical and empirical
work emphasizing the importance of complementarities between practices, I allow for diﬀerent eﬀects
on wages in ﬁrms that implement a system involving several of these practices relative to ﬁrms which
adopt individual practices. Finally, the eﬀect of employee involvement practices on wage dispersion may
diﬀer for ﬁrms above or below average wage dispersion. I employ quantile regressions to examine the
impact of employee involvement workplace practice adoption at diﬀerent percentiles of the distribution
of within ﬁrms wage dispersion.
A relationship between the implementation of employee involvement workplace practices and wage
dispersion can be motivated theoretically from two perspectives: a productivity perspective and an
incentives perspective. According to the productivity approach, workplace practices can be associated
with either lower or greater wage dispersion. Greater decentralization in decision making increases
1For a review of the empirical literature on human resources workplace practices and their eﬀect on ﬁrm performance,
see Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olson and Strauss (1996).
1the demand for skilled workers (Breshnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002)) requiring workers at the
bottom to be more productive and therefore causing their wages to rise. At the same time, changes
in work organization may also increase the productivity requirements of managerial jobs and therefore
managerial wages. The paper employs a production function framework incorporating aspects of both
of these approaches to derive an estimating equation. According to the incentive approach, ﬁrms whose
goal is to maximize the eﬀectiveness of workers cooperation and cohesiveness may do so by reducing the
dispersion of wages within the company (Lazear (1989), Levine (1991)). As a result, workplace practices
that increase the degree of employee involvement in the ﬁrm’s production and business strategies should
be associated with lower wage dispersion.
Despite both a vast empirical literature studying employee involvement practices in the workplace
and the theoretical work discussed above, very few studies have focused on the eﬀect of these practices
on wage outcomes. Helper, Levine and Bendoly (2002) investigate the eﬀect of employee involvement on
pay in the auto-supply industry in Canada and the US. They ﬁnd evidence that the practices raise the
wages of blue-collar workers by 3-5%. Black and Lynch (2000) and Cappelli and Carter (2000) analyze
the eﬀect of workplace organization practices on wage outcomes using a nationally representative sample
of US ﬁrms. More precisely, they look at the impact of various workplace practices on wages for diﬀerent
categories of workers within the ﬁrm (managers, supervisors, clerical workers, technicians and production
workers). They ﬁnd that the practices have diﬀerent impact on the wages of each type of workers. Using
the same data, Black, Lynch and Kryvelyova (2003) analyze the eﬀect of workplace practices on worker
outcomes in terms of wages and employment. Their analysis conﬁrm the results on wage outcomes found
in their previous study. They also include an analysis of the workplace practices on wage inequality
using the ratio of non production to production workers as a measure of wage dispersion. Given that
wage inequality is not the main focus of their paper, they do not examine issues of wage dispersion in
great depth.
The analysis in this paper uses data from the National Employer Survey (NES).2 This survey consists
of two nationally representative samples of U.S. private establishments interviewed in 1993 and 1996.
The surveys constitute a unique source of information for the analysis hereafter in that they provide
detailed information on employers’ human resource management practices such as recruitment strategies,
organization of the workplace and training provision and on average characteristics of its workforce
(where the information is available) for the diﬀerent categories of workers (managers, supervisors, clerical
workers, technicians and production or front-line workers). In addition, they report information on a
company’s equipment and technology characteristics. 3
2The data are the same data used in Black and Lynch (2000), Cappelli and Carter (2000), and Black, Lynch and
Kryvelyova (2003).
3See Cappelli (2001) for a detailed description of the design and variables provided in the two surveys.
2This paper focuses on a number of issues which have been de-emphasized and neglected in previous
studies using the NES data. First, the impact of workplace organization practices on wage outcomes
is assessed using the average wage ratio of managers and production workers rather than performing
individual analysis of workers’ wages separately for each category of workers. Apart from providing
information on wage dispersion, the use of a wage ratio helps control for unmeasured (by the econo-
metrician) ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage eﬀects that may bias cross-section estimations when wage equations are
estimated separately for each category of workers. This ﬁrm-eﬀect drops out from the wage ratio.
Second, the paper uses diﬀerent approaches to measure the eﬀect of employee involvement workplace
practices on wage dispersion. There may be variations in wage dispersion across establishments between
workplace practices adopters and non adopters. I therefore analyze the eﬀects of workplace practices
adoption, where ﬁrms are counted as adopters if a given proportion of their workers operate under
a given workplace practice. Wage dispersion may also be aﬀected by the intensity with which the
practices are used. In this case, wage dispersion is a function of the fraction of workers covered by a
given workplace practice.
Third, the paper analyzes the eﬀect of workplace organization practices on within ﬁrm wage dis-
persion at the mean as well as at diﬀerent percentiles of the distribution of wage dispersion across
establishments. This approach allows for diﬀerential eﬀects of the workplace practices on wage disper-
sion for higher and lower wage dispersion ﬁrms. To do so, I employ quantile regressions of the wage
ratio on employee involvement workplace practices.
Finally, the practices are not only analyzed individually but also as combinations or systems of prac-
tices. Theoretical work by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) and Milgrom and Roberts (1995)emphasize
the importance of analyzing a ﬁrm’s organizational decisions as part of a system of human resource
management policies. Productivity gains are obtained from exploiting complementarities in practices
and changes in only one practice bring little beneﬁt to a ﬁrm’s performance. For example, Milgrom and
Roberts (1995) show that teamwork will be more eﬀective in combination with job ﬂexibility, training
and communication. This is conﬁrmed by empirical studies showing evidence of the importance of
bundles of practices (Arthur (1992), MacDuﬃe (1995), Ichniowski, Shaw and Prenushi (1997)).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical framework summarizing the
relationship between wage dispersion and workplace organization from the diﬀerent perspectives of
wage determination. Section 3 describes the data. Starting with the variables common to the two
surveys, measures of workplace practices are analyzed as workers’ percentage and as dummy variables.
Section 4 is divided into two part. The ﬁrst part describes the results of the analysis based on employee
involvement practices adoption. The second part presents the results of OLS and quantile estimations
of the eﬀect of workplace practices on the manager-production workers wage ratio in terms employee
3involvement practices intensity. Section 5 concludes.
2 Framework of Analysis
A relationship between workplace organization practices and wage dispersion can be motivated using
two diﬀerent perspectives of wage determination: incentives or productivity. Both approaches provide
a rationale as to why there might be a link between workplace organization practices and within ﬁrm
wage dispersion. This section is divided into two parts. The ﬁrst part describes the ways in which each
approach motivates the link between workplace organization practices and wage dispersion. The second
part presents an empirical framework, consistent with either of these two approaches, that will serve as
a basis for the estimation part and the interpretation of the results.
2.1 Analytical Framework
According to the productivity approach, employee involvement workplace practices enhance worker
productivity. As a result, workers’ wages may be positively correlated with these practices. Moreover,
in the same spirit as in Breshnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1999), workplace organization practices
constitute an innovation that is complementary to product innovation and IT investments. These
factors taken together would explain the skill-biased technical changes that operated to increase the
relative demand for skilled workers in the 80’s. The authors ﬁnd evidence of complementarity between
workplace practices adoption, investment in IT and workers skills. Wage dispersion within and across
establishments may have been aﬀected by the adoption of new workplace organization practices.
The approach based on incentives or worker motivation and its implications for the relationship
between workplace organization and wage dispersion borrows from diﬀerent literatures. On the one
hand, research in organizational psychology provides a broad literature on the role of pay equity as a
factor aﬀecting employee motivation (Vroom (1964) , Lawler (1971)). An implication of this relationship
would be that for the implementation of the practices to be eﬀective in increasing ﬁrm performance,
wage compression may be a necessary tool to increase worker motivation. Economists have also provided
a rationale for the importance of social relations in the workplace and the use of pay compression to
maximize ﬁrm performance (Milgrom and Roberts (1988) and Lazear (1989)). Both analysis show
that inducing too much competition in the workplace may lead to output-reducing behavior such as
inﬂuence-seeking activity or sabotage of a co-worker’s productivity, for the purpose of obtaining a career
advantage. With a high amount of interdependence among co-workers, the loss of productivity resulting
from such behaviors can be minimized by reducing wage diﬀerentials. Levine (1991) further develops
the analysis of the links between workplace organization and wage dispersion by providing a model in
4which ﬁrms, seeking to increase group cohesiveness, may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to do so by paying eﬃciency
wages to the low end of the ﬁrm’s wage distribution therefore reducing wage dispersion.
Each approach predicts diﬀerent outcomes for the relationship between workplace practices and wage
dispersion. The cohesiveness or motivational approach predicts that workplace practices toward more
employee involvement should be associated with wage compression. The productivity or skill-biased
technical change approach can predict either lower or greater wage dispersion. One expects that an
increase in the demand for skilled workers following adoption of the practices leads to greater demands
in the task requirements for production workers and therefore greater wages. On the other hand, it also
leads to greater demands on the managerial part and therefore greater compensation for managers than
for production workers. Overall, whether workplace organization practices are associated with greater
or lower wage dispersion is an empirical question.
Evidence of increased wage dispersion following adoption of employee involvement practices would
favor the productivity hypothesis and the idea that managers’ productivity is increased by more than
production workers’ productivity by the practices. Evidence of wage compression may favor either
the motivational hypothesis or the productivity hypothesis if employee involvement practices increase
front-line workers’ productivity more than managers’ productivity.
Note that wage dispersion, as a prediction of the productivity hypothesis, can also be motivated
based on productivity loss rather than productivity gains associated with workplace practices adoption.
Indeed, it is likely that, shortly after adoption, productivity falls as changes in the organization of
the workplace involve adjustment costs. Those costs may be greater for production workers leading to
lower productivity and wages and therefore greater wage dispersion. To distinguish the two possibilities
one needs information on the timing of adoption and whether complementary training was adopted.
Information on training is available in the data and will be exploited in the estimation part.
2.2 Empirical Framework
According to the productivity hypothesis, wages reﬂect the value of workers’ marginal productivity.
The idea that workplace practices adoption follows from on-going skill-biased technical changes can be
represented in a production function framework as follows.
Assume a competitive economic environment in which ﬁrms’ production function depends on capital
and equipment, summarized in the variable K, and on two types of labor inputs, managerial LM and
production LF. It is assumed that workplace organization practices (summarized in the index P) aﬀect
production through their impact on labor eﬃciency units. Deﬁne θM(P)a n dθF(P) as the amount
of eﬃciency units associated with each type of labor. With Y as the aggregate output produced, the
production function can be deﬁned as:
5Y = F(K,θM(P)LM,θ F(P)LF)
Firms are proﬁt maximizers and given wage levels wM and wF for managers and front-line workers
respectively, the ﬁrst order conditions deﬁning the optimal choice of labor inputs provide the equality







Assuming a Cobb Douglas production function with constant returns to scale 4, the production func-
tion is given by:
F(K,θM(P)LM,θ F(P)LF)=Kα(θM(P)LM)βM(θF(P)LF)βF




























Following the literature on skill-biased technological change, it is assumed that the invention associ-
ated with workplace practices toward more employee involvement represents a discrete and exogenous
change in technological opportunities. Some ﬁrms have adopted the new workplace practices (P>0,
θ(P) > 1) while others haven’t (P =0 ,θ(0) = 1).
The last term of equation (6) represents the eﬀect of the use of workplace practices on wage dis-
persion. The identiﬁcation of this term will be based on the following reasoning. Among ﬁrms not
implementing the practices, the term vanishes because θM(0) = θF(0) = 1. The term will be non
4The use of a Cobb Douglas production function follows the empirical literature on the eﬀect of workplace practices on
ﬁrm performance. In particular, Black and Lynch (1997) tested the hypothesis of constant returns to scale based on the
NES data and could not reject it.
6zero whenever θM(P)  = θF(P) for ﬁrms adopters. This term can have a positive or negative impact
depending upon whether workplace practices increases managerial workers’ productivity more or less
than production workers.
Now consider the cohesiveness hypothesis proposed in Levine (1991), whereby production depends
upon worker cohesiveness C(.) which is a function of the ﬁrm’s wage dispersion:
Y = C(wF/wM)F(K,LM,L F)
where C is such that C  > 0a n dC   < 0. Given these assumptions, the ﬁrst-order condition for an
interior solution for the ﬁrm is to set the elasticity of the cohesiveness function C with respect to wage











Although the main derivations of the model are carried out under the assumption that the demand
for higher skilled workers is ﬁxed, the condition above is valid for both types of labor. Using this










Where CwF and CwM are the derivatives of the cohesiveness function with respect to wages for
production workers and managers respectively. This condition can be tested if the ratio of marginal
cohesiveness with respect to wages is assumed constant. Assume for example that C(wF,w M)=ewF−wM
and wF = λw M. This function is positive and increasing in wF and in wF/wM. The parameter λ




, equal to 1/λ, decreases with λ.
One can introduce the role of workplace practices in the ﬁrm’s decision to reduce wage dispersion
by assuming that workplace practices toward greater employee involvement aﬀect cohesiveness through
the parameter θ. Assume P is an index of workplace organization practices, then λ(P) is such that











The two perspectives of the relationship between workplace organization and wage dispersion de-







)+γP +   (10)
7Where   is an i.i.d. random noise satisfying the classical properties of a white noise. If work-
place practices are associated with greater (lower) wage dispersion the estimated γ will be positive or
(negative).
In order to better approximate LF and LM, variables related to average worker characteristics
for managers and production workers will be added to capture diﬀerences in worker quality. Firm
characteristics such as size, industry and its proportion of unionized workers will be included as controls
for diﬀerences in companies usually observed in the empirical literature to aﬀect wage outcomes and
wage dispersion. The value of capital and equipment are also added as controls, for the same reasons.
3 The Data
This section introduces the dataset used in this paper and discusses issues such as choice of variables
related to workplace practices and measurement method for the analysis. Section 3.1 describes the
two surveys used for the analysis. Section 3.2 summarizes the diﬀerent workplace organization and
employee involvement variables and discusses measurement issues in analyzing the eﬀect of adoption of
the practices (intensity of adoption versus adoption against non adoption). Since the data come from
establishment-level surveys, information on workers is limited. Section 3.3 discusses this point.
3.1 The NES Surveys
The data come from the National Employer Survey (NES), an establishment-level survey of employment
practices conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the National Center on Education Quality of the
Workforce (EQW). The survey was ﬁrst administered in 1994 to a nationally representative sample of
private establishments with more than 20 employees. It was repeated again in 1997 using the same
sampling frame as in 1994, based on the Bureau of the Census SSEL ﬁle. Public sector employers,
not-for-proﬁt institutions and corporate headquarters were excluded from the sample. The questions
apply to ﬁrm outcomes during the year preceding the survey year.
These surveys provide detailed information on employers human resource management practices
such as recruitment strategies, organization of the workplace and training investments. They also
report information on a company’s equipment and technology and on the average characteristics of
its workforce. The workforce information is available for diﬀerent categories of workers: managers,
supervisors, clerks, technicians and production or front-line workers.
The questionnaires for the two surveys are not identical. The NES 1993 has a detailed section
related to training investments and whereas NES 1996 has additional questions about school-to-work
transition and community involvement. On the other hand, there is a common set of core questions on
8ﬁrms and workers characteristics as well as on the organization of the workplace. In particular, there
is information on the value of the ﬁrm’s capital stock, the age of its equipment, the amount spent on
new equipment during the current year, labor and other costs, the establishment’s industry and size
and whether the establishment is part of a multi-establishment company.
The information on workforce characteristics include the percentage of workers in diﬀerent categories
(front-line workers, clerical workers, technicians, supervisors, and managers), the average education for
each of the category, the proportion of women and minorities, the percentage of workers hired during the
current year and whether the employees are represented by a union or covered by collective bargaining
agreements.
Information on wages comes from a question on the average pay for each category of full-time workers
in the establishment and is reported in one of the following ways: hourly, weekly, monthly or annual. I
use hourly wages and since average hours per week for each type of workers are asked in a subsequent
question, I compute average hourly pay for each case where pay were not reported on an hourly basis.
Note that in the NES 1993, average weekly hours worked are not asked about for managers. Since the
NES questions only concern full-time workers, I computed hourly pay for managers based on a 40 hours
week of work. 5
Questions related to the organization of the workplace are identical in the two surveys with only one
exception. The NES 1993 asked whether the establishment has adopted a Total Quality Management
program, but this question is not asked in the NES 1996. In place, it is asked whether the establishment
has undergone re-engineering. Since TQM can be viewed as a form of re-engineering of the workplace,
both questions provide similar information and will be considered in the analysis hereafter. The ﬁnal
samples, with non missing observations on all variables, contain information for 816 establishments in
1993 and 765 in 1996.
3.2 Workplace Organization and Employee Involvement Practices
The NES contains detailed information on the practices related to the level of employee involvement,
workplace organization, and the use of stock option or proﬁt sharing. This section presents summary
statistics for these variables (table 1) and analyzes the question of adoption versus intensity of use of
employee involvement practices (table 2).
Table 1 presents the means of the diﬀerent variables on workplace practices for the year 1993 and
1996. Considering ﬁrst the year 1993 for all sectors (ﬁrst column), one can see that among the three
practices related to employee involvement, job-related meetings is the practice that applied the most
5Note also that for for workers reporting annual pay, I computed hourly pay dividing by weekly hours times 51 weeks
of work per year.
9intensively in establishments with, on average over all establishments, 52.3 % of the non-managerial and
non-supervisory workers under this practice. Job rotation and self-directed teamwork, when adopted
by ﬁrms, is used on average by 12.1% and 13.7% of the workforce respectively.
Comparing these results with the year 1996 for all sectors (column 4), one can see an increase in
the percentage of non-managerial and non- supervisory workers using each of the three involvement
practices. Looking at the practices by manufacturing and non manufacturing sectors, one observes that
a greater proportion of workers are engaged in job rotation in manufacturing establishments whereas
for non manufacturing businesses, meetings and teamwork are more common. The workers percentage
has increased between 1993 and 1996 in both sectors for all three practices.
Among the variables describing the organization of the workplace, the number of management levels
and the number of workers per supervisor in the company reﬂect the degree of hierarchy and levels of
authority in the organization. Over all sectors these two measures decreased between 1993 and 1996,
suggesting a change in the type of internal organization of the establishments during the two years.
The variables regarding the use of benchmarking, TQM or re- engineering do not change much during
the two years. The most striking feature from the table is that the proportion investing in training for
working in teams has almost doubled between the two years. At the same time, the proportion of
establishments using proﬁt sharing or stock option as part of the compensation system declined by
almost half.
It is interesting to see that very few establishments use all of the preceding practices all together
(3% in 1993 and 2% in 1996) but at the same time, very few companies do not use any of them (2% in
1993 and 1% in 1996).
Table 2 describes the preceding workplace and organization practices but this time, showing the
frequencies rather than analyzing the intensity of use. I built two types of dummy variables shown in
the two columns of the table for each year: one to indicate that the establishment uses at least the given
practice and the other to indicate that the given practice is the only practice used by the establishment.
Looking at the column “At least”, one can clearly see that meetings is the practice adopted by the
majority of ﬁrms (86% in 1993 and 84% in 1996). Moreover, although teamwork and job rotation are
not used by a large percentage of workers, between 40 and 50% of the establishments use them. From
the column “Only”, the very low percentages demonstrate that the practices tend to be used as bundles
rather than individually.
Overall comparing 1993 and 1996, tables 1 and 2 reﬂect the ﬁndings from previous studies using the
NES data as well as similar cross-industry data on workplace practices (Osterman (2000)): according
to table 2, there has been an increase in the adoption of individual practices but the proportion of ﬁrms
adopting the full set of practices (employee involvement as well as other workplace practices and pay
10related practices) remains fairly small (4% from table 1).
Given the previous results, I selected the three employee involvement practices mainly used and
computed a set of dummy variables describing the eight possible combinations of one, two and three of
the practices including non adoption. The bottom half of table 2 shows the frequencies for the diﬀerent
possible bundles. One can see that for some of the bundles like teamwork only (T) or teamwork and
job rotation (TJ) the frequencies are very low especially when the sample is divided into manufacturing
and non manufacturing. Given that the analysis hereafter will use each sample separately, a broader
deﬁnition of bundles will be more appropriate.
A broader deﬁnition of bundles can be used by using a criteria based on the number of practices
adopted. The full system is deﬁned as a system where the three practices are adopted, the partial
system is deﬁned as having one or two of the practices adopted. The last system is the null system
where none of the employee involvement practices are adopted. The frequencies associated with these
systems are shown at the bottom of the table. One can see that 24% of the ﬁrms adopted the full
system in 1993 and 31% in 1996. The percentage of ﬁrms under the null system did not change over
the two years while the proportion of ﬁrms under the partial system decreased from 69% in 1994 to
63% in 1996. The remainder of the analysis will focus on these systems, controlling for the other types
of workplace practices variables. Note that the variables indicating adoption of a practice or system of
practices have been created using a broad deﬁnition of adoption. If at least 1% of the workers in the ﬁrm
operate under the given practice, the establishment is considered to have adopted the practice. Since
the sample includes large and medium sized establishments, 1% may represent a reasonable minimum 6
Appendix B shows the means of all the variables used in the analysis hereafter by type of system
used (as deﬁned above) for both years. Comparing the columns of the tables associated with the full
system to those with the null system for both years allows one to emphasize possible diﬀerences in the
average proﬁles of adopters and non adopters. For both years, ﬁrms that adopted the full system have
on average more educated managers and front-line workers. In terms of average wage dispersion, the
ratio of average wages for managers and production workers is greater under the full system relative
to the null system suggesting greater wage dispersion in establishments that adopted the full system.
Comparing average wages of managers and front-line workers separately, one can see that production
workers tend to have slightly higher wages in establishments that did not adopt a system of employee
involvement practices.
In summary, from the descriptive analysis, a comparison of non adopters to all-practices adopters
shows substantial diﬀerences. In particular, wage dispersion is higher in ﬁrms adopting all of the
6Appendix A.1 discusses this point and shows the average percentage of (non-managerial and non-supervisory) workers
under the given bundles of practices deﬁned at the 1% level.
11practices relative to non adopters. Since diﬀerences in ﬁrm and workforce characteristics are also
substantial, the eﬀect of the practices on wage dispersion will be more rigourously established using
OLS regressions in which proper controls for ﬁrms and workers characteristics are included. Before
presenting the regression analysis results, the next section discusses limitations of the NES data.
3.3 Data limitations
As it is a plant-level dataset, the NES does not have detailed variables on establishment’s workforce
characteristics. In particular, workers’ average experience or tenure are not available. These variables
aﬀect individual wages and may explain a substantial part of the manager-production workers wage dif-
ferentials. Given that the paper focuses on the analysis of variations in the manager/production worker
wage ratio across establishments, it is important to ﬁrst verify whether or not the lack of control for
average experience modiﬁes the cross-establishment variations in wage diﬀerentials. Using information
on workers potential experience from the CPS in the years 1993 and 1996, the manager/production
worker wage ratio is estimated across industries and ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. The inclusion of workers
experience does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the estimated ratio (see Appendix A.2 for details).
A second important limitation of these data set is that there is no information on the date the
ﬁrm started to adopt the practice. It is therefore diﬃcult to identify properly the eﬀects that would
be speciﬁcally related to the timing of adoption (learning eﬀects at adoption as well as diﬀerences in
experience with the given practices). The analysis in this paper is based on the assumption that all
ﬁrms that adopted the practices, have done so during the same period within the last 25 years.
Finally, although the NES 1996 sample has a longitudinal component of about 900 companies that
also participated in the survey of the NES 1993, the longitudinal link is not publicly available. On the
other hand, previous studies using the NES that have exploited the longitudinal aspect of the NES have
not found much diﬀerences in the results when using OLS or ﬁxed-eﬀect estimations (Black and Lynch
(1997) and (2000)). Using the longitudinal format of the NES may not constitute an improvement in
the quality of the results if the number of workplace practices switchers is very small which is likely to
be the case given the years analyzed (mid-90s) and the short period of time between the two years.
As a result, the analysis hereafter uses the cross-sectional aspect of the data to identify the eﬀect
of the practices through inter-establishment variations. The methodology however does not take into
account eﬀects due to ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity. On that last point, the analysis in this
paper based on wage ratios rather than wage levels has the advantage of controlling for a given type of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, if the unobserved heterogeneity term is constant over
time and aﬀects similarly the wages of all categories of workers, it will drop out of the wage ratio
equation.
124 Results
The goal in this paper is to explore the relationship between workplace organization changes and wage
dispersion by asking the following questions: Is there a link between employee involvement workplace
practices and within-ﬁrm wage dispersion? Is wage dispersion aﬀected by adoption of such practices?
Is wage dispersion aﬀected by the intensity with which the practices are used (measured by the ﬁrm’s
percentage of workers under the given practice)?
This section presents the results of estimations of equation (10) where the log of the manager/production
worker ratio is regressed on employee involvement workplace practices controlling for ﬁrm technology,
workforce characteristics and workplace organization. The ﬁrst part of the analysis focuses on work-
place practices adoption. Systems of employee involvement practices, like the ones discussed in the
previous section, are used to explain cross-establishment variation in wage dispersion among adopters
and non adopters. The second part of the analysis looks at the eﬀect of the intensity of use of employee
involvement practices on wage dispersion.
Note that given the lack of information on average hours worked for managers in the NES 1993 and
the resulting imprecision in the measurement of the hourly wage ratio, the analysis hereafter focuses on
the NES 1996. The results from estimations based on the NES 1993 are shown for illustration and any
diﬀerences in the results should be interpreted with caution.
4.1 Wage Dispersion and Employee Involvement Practices Adoption
This section investigates the impact of ﬁrms adoption of employee involvement practices on wage disper-
sion analyzing cross-establishments variations in the log of the wage ratio for managers and production
workers between adopters and non adopters. From the analysis in section 3 (and in particular based on
table 2), there are substantial variations in adoption rate depending upon the ways the employee in-
volvement practices on problem-solving meetings, self-managed teamwork and job rotation are grouped
into bundles. The analysis hereafter uses the deﬁnition of a bundle based on the number of employee
involvement practices adopted as deﬁned in section 3. The analysis is based on regressions of the log
of managers/production workers wage ratio on dummies indicating whether the ﬁrm adopted the full
set of practices, a partial system based on one or two practices or none of the practices. Results are
presented in table 5 and 6 for both NES surveys. The regressions are performed without constant terms
so the coeﬃcients associated with each of the systems corresponds to the estimated log ratio of the
wages of managers and front-line workers, or the managerial premium under each system.
Each column summarizes the results for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the regression equation. The
column labelled speciﬁcation I corresponds to the base case where only workforce characteristics are
13included. Speciﬁcation II shows the results when speciﬁcation I is augmented by technology controls and
speciﬁcation III adds workplace organization controls. In speciﬁcation IV, the employee involvement
system dummies are interacted with the variable indicating whether production workers received training
about problem-solving meetings and teamwork during the last three years. Speciﬁcation V adds a
dummy for the use of proﬁt sharing or stock options. The results for each speciﬁcation are summarized
into two columns showing the estimated coeﬃcients and the value of the χ2 statistic from a test of
equality between the estimated log wage ratios. Finally, each table is further divided into two panels
each showing the results from the regressions applied to the samples of manufacturing (upper panel)
and non manufacturing ﬁrms (lower panel).
The ﬁrst two columns of table 5 show the estimated managerial wage premia associated to each
system (null, partial and full) with controls for workforce characteristics. Notice that compared to the
raw averages presented in appendix B, the inclusion of workforce characteristics reduces substantially
the estimated gap with an estimated 33% managerial premium in the manufacturing sector among
establishment that did not adopt employee involvement practices and 34% in the non manufacturing
sector. The estimated premia varies across systems and speciﬁcations and remain strongly signiﬁcant.
Note that it is not always the case on the non manufacturing sector but this may be explained by the
much smaller sample size of non manufacturing ﬁrms.
To better illustrate the diﬀerences in the wage premia across systems, ﬁgures 1 and 2 below graph
the estimated managerial wage premia by type of employee involvement system adopted for the year
1996 for the manufacturing and non manufacturing sectors respectively. From ﬁgure 1 describing the
manufacturing sector case, one can see that the systems of partial use of the involvement practices (when
only one or two of the three practices is used) and the full systems are both associated with greater
wage dispersion relative to the null system (none of the practices adopted) The additional controls do
not change these results.
Going back to table 5 for the manufacturing sector, one can see that the diﬀerences in the premia
are signiﬁcant between the null system and the partial system as well as the full system. Indeed, for the
diﬀerence between the null system and the partial system, the value of the statistics in speciﬁcations
IV or V (which controls for stock option and proﬁt sharing) are equal to 6.44 and 6.59 which implies
that equality in the estimated wage premia between establishments with no system and those with a
partial system is rejected at the 99% conﬁdence level.
Figure 2 illustrates the non manufacturing case. The results are similar to the manufacturing sector
in that adoption of an employee involvement system (whether full or partial) is associated with greater
wage dispersion. The statistics of the tests of equality between wage premia across systems in the second
panel of table 5 show that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the managerial wage premia under
14Figure 1: Wage Dispersion and Workplace Practices Adoption - NES 1996
Figure 2: Wage Dispersion and Workplace Practices Adoption - NES 1996
15Figure 3: Wage Dispersion and Workplace Practices Adoption - NES 1993
no system and the one under the full system with values equal to 2.20 and 2.24 (in speciﬁcation IV and
V respectively) which implies that equality is rejected at the 87% conﬁdence level. These results are
weaker than the one found in the manufacturing case but recall that the sample size is much smaller
which reduces the precision with which the coeﬃcients are estimated.
Finally, speciﬁcation IV of table 5 shows the interactions between training for production workers 7
and the system dummies. It is interesting to see that ﬁrms that complement the employee involvement
system (either the partial or the full system) with training for production workers have lower wage
dispersion relative to ﬁrms who don’t complement the system with training. The diﬀerence is strongly
signiﬁcant in the non manufacturing sector where the reduction in the managerial wage premia for
establishments under the full system is estimated to be of 0.234 percentage point. As a result the
estimated wage premia for ﬁrms under the system which also adopted complementary training comes
down to about 27%.
The results from the NES 1993 dataset are summarized in ﬁgure 3 and table 6 for both sectors. From
ﬁgure 3 one can see that the variations in the estimated managerial wage premia are similar to those
in the NES 1996. In both manufacturing and non manufacturing sectors, the estimated managerial
premium for establishments that did not adopt a system is smaller than the premium at establishments
7The training relates speciﬁcally to problem-solving meetings and teamwork.
16that adopted either the partial or the full system. Note that the estimated premium are greater in mag-
nitude, especially in the manufacturing case. Given that hourly wages for managers are approximated
using an average of 40 hours per week, the approximation tends to overestimate average hourly wages
for managers. The bias seems to be even stronger in the manufacturing sector. From table 6 one can see
that the diﬀerences in the wage premia are signiﬁcant though the tests show lower level of conﬁdence
than with the NES 1996.
Overall the results are similar for both years and both sectors in terms of the positively signiﬁcant
link between employee involvement practices and wage dispersion. There is evidence of lower dispersion
in establishments that complement the practices with training compared to those who do not. The
evidence is signiﬁcant in the non manufacturing case in the NES 1996.
To further investigate the eﬀect of employee involvement workplace practices on wage dispersion,
the next sub-section analyzes cross-establishment variations in wage dispersion in terms of practices
intensity of use, measured by the percentage of workers operating under the given practice.
4.2 Wage Dispersion and Employee Involvement Practices Intensity
The objectives in this sub-section are twofold. The analysis ﬁrst replicates the approach taken in
previous studies on workplace practices using the NES data. In these studies 8, employee involvement
practices like problem-solving meetings, teamwork and job rotation are analyzed as percentage of non
managerial and non supervisory workers currently under a given practice. This measure allows one to
analyze the importance of intensity of use of such practices. In a ﬁrst step, the analysis investigates
the impact of factors related to workforce, technology and workplace characteristics on within ﬁrm
wage dispersion. The impact of employee involvement is then analyzed after controlling for cross-
establishments variations in workforce, technology and workplace factors. A second objective is to
investigate the possibility that the eﬀect of the practices on wage dispersion varies between ﬁrms with
low wage or high wage dispersion and present the results of an analysis based on quantile regressions.
The results on the impact of the employee involvement practices, in terms of percentage of workers,
on the log of the wage ratio are presented in tables 5 and 6 for the NES 1996 and NES 1993 respectively.
In each table, the three ﬁrst columns describe three diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst column corresponds
to the base speciﬁcation in which the log of the wage ratio is regressed on establishment’s workforce and
technology characteristics. The next column describes the result of the same regression where workplace
variables have been added. The third column corresponds to the previous regression and the inclusion
of the three employee involvement practices. The last two columns consider the third speciﬁcation over
the sample of manufacturing and non manufacturing establishments.
8Black and Lynch (2000), Cappelli and Neumark (2001) and Cappelli and Carter (2000).
17The results from the NES 1996 in table 5 show that most of the workforce characteristics have a
signiﬁcant impact on wage dispersion and that except for costs, none the technology characteristics have
an impact. 9 Education of production workers signiﬁcantly reduces the managers- production workers
wage ratio. A greater proportion of women and minorities is associated with greater wage dispersion.
These results are consistent with those found in Black and Lynch (2000) also based on the NES 1996.
Not surprisingly, establishment that have a unionized workforce have lower wage dispersion. The
wage compression eﬀect is however not signiﬁcant in the manufacturing sector. Given that the pro-
portion of unionized ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector is not insigniﬁcant (in this sample about 35%
of manufacturing ﬁrms have a unionized workforce), this absence of compression eﬀect suggests that
spillover eﬀects might be important.
In the next part of the table, the results show the eﬀect of the variables describing computer
use, workplace organization and employee involvement practices. The percentage of managers using
computer does not have a signiﬁcant impact on wage dispersion suggesting that it may aﬀect both
categories of workers similarly. 10 The percentage of non-managers using a computer has a signiﬁcant
positive impact on wage dispersion suggesting a diﬀerential impact on the wages of managers and
front-line workers.
This result may be surprising given the common ﬁnding on the positive impact of computer use on
wages. One would expect the wages of front-line workers to be positively aﬀected and therefore wage
dispersion to reduce. Given that the variable on computer use includes all non-managerial workers, it
may either not directly inﬂuence wages for front-line workers or inﬂuence it positively but in a smaller
extent than the wages of managers. One may also suspect that computer use captures greater managerial
ability which translates into greater dispersion due to greater wages for managers although the fact that
the percentage of managers using computer does aﬀect wage dispersion rules out this last conjecture.
ﬁrms that are associated
Among the workplace organization variables, neither benchmarking, nor re-engineering have an
impact on wage dispersion. Although surprising, this result is similar to Black and Lynch (2000)
and Cappelli and Carter (2000) who ﬁnd positive impacts of the same magnitude on the wages of
both managers and production workers for re-engineering and no signiﬁcant impact for benchmarking.
Contrary to these two studies, the number of managerial levels signiﬁcantly aﬀect wage dispersion in
the manufacturing sector. One expects that greater hierarchical levels would be associated with greater
diﬀerences in pay.
9The information on costs relates to energy costs, raw materials, goods and services purchased in the course of doing
business. This variable is the only technology related variable that is signiﬁcant and is associated with greater wage
dispersion. This result suggests that ﬁrms may pass some of their costs onto production workers reducing their wages.
10Note that the eﬀect remains insigniﬁcant when one does not include the variable on computer use for non-managerial
workers.
18Among the three employee involvement practices deﬁned by the percentage of workers participating
in regular problem-solving meetings, teamwork and job rotation, teamwork has a strong positive impact
on wage dispersion in the non manufacturing sector. On the other hand, given that the sample is very
small, this result may not be representative of the non manufacturing sector.
Table 6 presents the results based on the NES 1993 and one can see that they are similar to those
from the NES 1996 in that the workforce characteristics variables are the one aﬀecting wage dispersion
while almost none of the technology variables and workplace organization variables have a signiﬁcant
impact.
Note that in the NES 1993, among the workplace organization variables that may potentially aﬀect
wage dispersion, it is the span of control represented by the number of workers per supervisors rather
than the hierarchical levels that has a signiﬁcant positive impact on wage dispersion. This result
suggest that less supervision (or more workers per supervisors) would be associated with greater wages
for managers conditional on production workers’ wages. This could be interpreted as compensating
diﬀerentials to managers for taking on supervisory responsibilities. As with the NES 1996, teamwork is
associated with greater wage dispersion in the non manufacturing sector. In addition, problem-solving
meetings is weakly signiﬁcant and also positively associated with greater wage dispersion in the non
manufacturing sector.
Overall, the results show that wage dispersion do not seem to be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by employee
involvement workplace practices as measured by the ﬁrm’s percentage of workers under the given prac-
tice. However, it is possible that the practices have an impact on wage dispersion for ﬁrms above or
below average wage dispersion. In other words, the eﬀect of employee involvement practices on ﬁrms
wage dispersion may diﬀer at diﬀerent percentiles of the distribution of wage ratios. I now consider an
analysis of the practices intensity based on quantile regressions of the log of the manager/production
worker wage ratio.
The results of the quantile regressions are shown in table 7 for both the NES 1996 and NES 1993.
Interestingly, an analysis at diﬀerent part of the wage ratio distribution across establishments show
some evidence of diﬀerential eﬀects. Indeed, whereas the eﬀects of the practices were very small and
non signiﬁcant when estimated at the mean of the wage ratio distribution in the NES 1996 (table 5),
they are signiﬁcant at the 25th percentile or for low wage dispersion ﬁrms. Moreover, the practices do
not have the same eﬀects on wage dispersion. Whereas problem-solving meetings and job rotation are
associated with an increase in wage dispersion, self-managed teamwork reduces the dispersion.
In the non manufacturing case, the results based on the NES 1996 show that the eﬀects of the
practices, similar in signs as those found at the mean of the wage ratio distribution (from table 5), are
signiﬁcant at the 90th percentile or for high wage dispersion ﬁrms.
19Note that the eﬀects in the manufacturing case diﬀer from the non manufacturing case. Problem-
solving meetings are associated with lower dispersion and teamwork with greater wage dispersion which
are opposite to the eﬀects found in the manufacturing case. On the other hand, the eﬀects are similar
in signs between the two sectors when one compares them at the same percentiles of the wage ratio
distribution. Indeed, at the 25th percentile, problem-solving meetings and job rotation are associated
with greater dispersion while teamwork compresses the distribution in both sectors. In particular, the
positive eﬀect of problem-solving meetings on wage dispersion among low dispersion ﬁrms at the 25th
percentile is signiﬁcant in the non manufacturing sector in the NES 1993 dataset.
In summary, the results suggest that employee involvement practices aﬀect the wage dispersion of
low wage dispersion ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector. More precisely, problem-solving meetings and
job rotation are associated with greater dispersion and teamwork is associated with wage compression
the low wage dispersion ﬁrms. In the non manufacturing sector, problem-solving meetings are associated
with lower wage dispersion for high wage dispersion ﬁrms.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I explored the link between workplace organization practices and wage dispersion within
ﬁrms. Using two samples of nationally representative U.S. establishments for the years 1993 and 1996
I estimated the eﬀect of employee involvement workplace practices adoption and intensity of use (as
measured by the percentage of workers under the given practice in the company) on within ﬁrm wage
dispersion measured by the ratio of average wages for managers and production workers. I also analyze
the possibility that involvement practices aﬀect ﬁrms diﬀerently depending upon whether they are at
the low or high end of the distribution of the manager/production workers wage ratios.
The results suggest that adoption of employee involvement workplace practices is associated with
greater wage dispersion. Compared to establishments not using any of the involvement practices, ﬁrms
that adopt a partial system or full system of practices, including regular problem-solving meetings
and/or self-managed team and/or job rotation, have signiﬁcantly greater wage dispersion. On the
other hand, ﬁrms that complement the practices with training for production workers (on teamwork or
problem-solving meetings) have lower dispersion than those who do not complement with training.
The results based on employee involvement intensity of use show evidence of compression eﬀects
associated with self-managed teamwork in the manufacturing sector at the 25th percentile or for low
wage dispersion ﬁrms. There is also evidence of wage compression eﬀects associated with problem-
solving meetings in the non manufacturing sector for high wage dispersion ﬁrms.
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21Table 1: Workplace Organization and Practices, Meansa for NES 1993 and 1996
Year 1993 1996
Variables All Manuf. Non Man. All Manuf. Non Man.
Involvement
Meeting (% wkrs) 52.35 38.88 58.44 61.88 57.23 63.46
(1.51) (1.83) (2.53) (1.46) (1.81) (2.58)
Team (% wkrs) 12.13 10.38 12.92 19.07 18.95 19.11
(0.87) (1.04) (1.52) (1.12) (1.38) (1.98)
Job Rot. (% wkrs) 13.70 15.90 12.70 16.45 25.36 13.40
(0.92) (1.25) (1.49) (0.97) (1.47) (1.51)
Workplace
# Management Lvls 2.06 1.95 2.11 1.73 2.15 1.58
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.20) (0.09)
# Wkrs/Supervisor 15.28 15.54 15.16 12.62 13.98 12.16
(0.68) (0.88) (1.14) (0.45) (0.61) (0.76)
Benchmarking 0.28 0.24 0.30 0.33 0.28 0.34
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
TQM/Re-engineering 0.35 0.40 0.29 0.32 0.29
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Training Team 0.53 0.50 0.54 0.70 0.65 0.72
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Pay
Stock Opt.-Prof. Sha. 0.77 0.74 0.79 0.46 0.51 0.44
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
All Practices 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No Practices 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
ComputerUse
% Managers 0.74 0.70 0.76 82.42 82.98 82.23
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (1.14) (1.19) (2.14)
% Others 0.41 0.25 0.48 61.00 33.86 70.25
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (1.42) (1.35) (2.44)
N 816 537 279 765 527 238
a-Standard errors in parenthesis.
22Table 2: Practices Variables and Bundles, NES 1993 and NES 1996
Individual Practice Frequencies
Year 1993 1996
Variables At least Only At least Only
Involvement
Meetings 0.844 0.021 0.884 0.002
Team 0.368 0.000 0.420 0.000
Job Rotation 0.452 0.010 0.487 0.002
Workplace
Benchmarking 0.277 0.006 0.325 0.001
TQM/Reengineering 0.353 0.003 0.293 0.000
Training 0.525 0.021 0.704 0.000
Pay
Stock Opt.-Prof. Sha. 0.774 0.045 0.455 0.001
N 816 816 765 765
Practice Bundle Frequencies
Year 1993 1996
Variables All Manuf. Non Man. All Manuf. Non Man.
Wkr ≥ 1%
One Practice
Meetings (M) 0.298 0.315 0.290 0.270 0.214 0.290
Team (T) 0.008 0.000 0.011 0.022 0.015 0.024
Job Rotation (J) 0.034 0.052 0.026 0.013 0.015 0.013
Two Practices
MT 0.140 0.091 0.162 0.151 0.133 0.157
MJ 0.198 0.191 0.201 0.224 0.257 0.214
TJ 0.011 0.028 0.004 0.011 0.019 0.009
All/No Practices
MTJ 0.208 0.173 0.223 0.238 0.279 0.224
NOMTJ 0.103 0.150 0.082 0.070 0.069 0.071
System
No EI 0.078 0.088 0.061 0.061 0.060 0.063
Partial EI 0.682 0.662 0.717 0.630 0.585 0.730
Full EI 0.239 0.248 0.221 0.307 0.353 0.205



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table 5: Workplace Organization and Practices and Wage Dispersiona - NES 1996
Speciﬁcationsb (1) (2) (3) (3) (3)
Manuf. Non Man.
Workforce
Education Managers 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.009 0.018
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.025)
Education Ft-Lines -0.069** -0.062** -0.069** -0.060* -0.065
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.036) (0.043)
% Women 0.474*** 0.488*** 0.473*** 0.086 0.643***
(0.099) (0.105) (0.110) (0.132) (0.162)
% Minorities 0.190** 0.253*** 0.247*** 0.319*** 0.199*
(0.081) (0.078) (0.076) (0.077) (0.184)
% New Hired 0.038 0.120 0.125 0.327** 0.117
(0.127) (0.122) (0.121) (0.160) (0.184)
Union Dummy -0.154*** -0.110** -0.112** -0.003 -0.230***
(0.052) (0.051) (0.050) (0.056) (0.071)
% Managers -0.313 -0.261 -0.293 -0.175 -0.459*
(0.204) (0.190) (0.190) (0.239) (0.280)
% Ft-Lines -0.110 0.066 0.064 -0.064 0.116
(0.117)) (0.108) (0.105) (0.192) (0.143)
Technology
% Equipment < 1 yr 0.031 0.105 0.062 0.105 0.144
(0.131) (0.139) (0.136) (0.209) (0.204)
% Equipment 5-10 yr 0.009 0.079 0.058 -0.125 0.057
(0.094) (0.091) (0.091) (0.123) (0.155)
% Equipment > 11 yr 0.048 0.025 0.012 -0.210* 0.056
(0.113) (0.117) (0.117) (0.112) (0.196)
Capital Stock -0.017 -0.015 -0.012 -0.003 -0.002
$ value, in log (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020)
New Equipt -0.015 -0.022 -0.021 -0.028 -0.021
$ value, in log (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022)
Labor Cost 0.032 0.000 -0.003 -0.037 0.024
$ value, in log (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.035)
Other Costs 0.029* 0.039** 0.039** 0.023 0.039*
$ value, in log (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.022)
a-The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of average wages of managers and production
workers.
b-Also include industry and ﬁrm-size dummies. Standard errors computed using the White
correction. 1% signiﬁcance level: ***. 5% signiﬁcance level: **. 10% signiﬁcance level: *.
26Table 5: Workplace Organization and Practices and Wage Dispersiona - NES 1996
(Continued)
Speciﬁcationsb (1) (2) (3) (3) (3)
Manuf. Non Man.
Computer Use
% Managers -0.101 -0.104 -0.049 -0.119
(0.083) (0.082) (0.097) (0.115)
% Others 0.137* 0.128* 0.153** 0.079
(0.073) (0.071) (0.075) (0.093)
Workplace Organization
# Management Levels 0.007* 0.006* 0.005*** 0.015
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.018)
# Wkrs/Supervisor 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Benchmarking 0.051 0.051 -0.020 0.140*
(0.047) (0.050) (0.048) (0.075)
Re-engineering -0.023 -0.100* 0.021 0.006
(0.049) (0.050) (0.041) (0.081)
Ft-lines Team/meetings Training -0.066 -0.073 -0.055 -0.085
(0.049) (0.051) (0.047) (0.070)
Pay
Stock Option-Proﬁt Sharing -0.060 -0.056 -0.008 -0.065
(0.058) (0.056) (0.041) (0.089)
Involvement
Meeting (% wkrs) -0.059 0.022 -0.146**
(0.055) (0.053) (0.086)
Team (% wkrs) 0.099 -0.030 0.190*
(0.077) (0.089) (0.112)
Job Rotation (% wkrs) -0.006 0.075 -0.027
(0.073) (0.067) (0.146)
R2 0.233 0.333 0.343 0.265 0.475
N 735 648 648 476 172
a-The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of average wages of managers and production
workers.
b-Also include industry and ﬁrm-size dummies. Standard errors computed using the White
correction. 1% signiﬁcance level: ***. 5% signiﬁcance level: **. 10% signiﬁcance level: *.
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Speciﬁcationsb (1) (2) (3) (3) (3)
Manuf. Non Man.
Workforce
Education Managers 0.038** 0.035** 0.032** 0.046** 0.010
(0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.02) (0.019)
Education Ft-Lines -0.047 -0.045* -0.049* -0.115** -0.026
(0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.058) (0.031)
% Women 0.065 0.084 0.076 0.178 0.042
(0.115) (0.121) (0.116) (0.115) (0.149)
% Minorities 0.357*** 0.302*** 0.309*** 0.315*** 0.054
(0.118) (0.105) (0.104) (0.115) (0.139)
% New Hired -0.094 -0.083 -0.025 0.483 -0.197
(0.153) (0.174) (0.172) (0.332) (0.156)
Union Dummy -0.041 -0.039 -0.037 0.024 -0.102
(0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.073) (0.087)
% Managers -0.494 -0.507 -0.498 -0.503 -0.507
(0.476) (0.444) (0.440) (0.554) (0.519)
% Ft-Lines -0.164 -0.238* -0.250* -0.448** -0.110
(0.145) (0.140) (0.140) (0.188) (0.165)
Technology
% Equipment < 1 yr -0.229 -0.216 -0.282 -0.409* -0.016
(0.171) (0.173) (0.174) (0.225) (0.219)
% Equipment 5-10 yr -0.041 -0.045 -0.069 -0.202 0.015
(0.113) (0.124) (0.119) (0.165) (0.144)
% Equipment > 11 yr -0.166* -0.187* -0.202* -0.318** -0.013
(0.104) (0.107) (0.105) (0.131) (0.140)
Capital Stock 0.019 0.005 -0.004 -0.027 0.003
$ value, in log (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.029)
New Equipt 0.022 0.026 0.037 0.024 0.035
$ value, in log (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022)
Labor Cost -0.030 -0.043 -0.050 0.002 -0.088
$ value, in log (0.044) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.060)
Other Costs 0.016 0.045 0.054 -0.040 0.120
$ value, in log (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.077)
a-The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of average wages of managers and production
workers.
b-Also include industry and ﬁrm-size dummies. Standard errors computed using the White
correction. 1% signiﬁcance level: ***. 5% signiﬁcance level: **. 10% signiﬁcance level: *.
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(Continued)
Speciﬁcationsb (1) (2) (3) (3) (3)
Manuf. Non Man.
Computer Use
% Managers -0.168* -0.213** -0.088 -0.394***
(0.091) (0.089) (0.108) (0.125)
% Others 0.058 0.055 -0.085 0.168*
(0.083) (0.079) (0.101) (0.099)
Workplace
# Management Levels -0.008 -0.004 0.038 -0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.019)
# Wkrs/Supervisor 0.003** 0.003** 0.001 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Benchmarking 0.032 0.008 0.009 0.027
(0.052) (0.048) (0.062) (0.059)
TQM -0.020 -0.021 0.020 -0.020
(0.055) (0.055) (0.062) (0.075)
Ft-lines Team/meetings Training -0.020 -0.027 0.033 -0.024
(0.053) (0.052) (0.069) (0.070)
Pay
Stock Option-Proﬁt Sharing -0.011 -0.014 -0.049 0.072
(0.068) (0.069) (0.065) (0.093)
Involvement
Meeting (% wkrs) 0.054 -0.030 0.138*
(0.053) (0.065) (0.079)
Team (% wkrs) 0.180** 0.074 0.225**
(0.090) (0.101) (0.104)
Job Rotation (% wkrs) -0.070 0.005 -0.140
(0.085) (0.067) (0.173)
R2 0.225 0.268 0.283 0.330 0.419
N 729 729 729 489 240
a-The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of average wages of managers and production
workers.
b-Also include industry and ﬁrm-size dummies. Standard errors computed using the White
correction. 1% signiﬁcance level: ***. 5% signiﬁcance level: **. 10% signiﬁcance level: *.
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Quantile Regressions
Manufacturing Non Manufacturing
Quantilesb 10th 25th 75th 90th 10th 25th 75th 90th
NES96
Meeting (% wkrs) -0.002 0.099** 0.093 0.029 0.047 0.083 -0.158 -0.336**
(0.051) (0.044) (0.063) (0.087) (0.125) (0.104) (0.124) (0.160)
Team (% wkrs) -0.106* -0.161** -0.009 -0.059 0.107 -0.086 0.161 0.142
(0.064) (0.065) (0.090) (0.080) (0.199) (0.165) (0.173) (0.171)
Job Rotation (% wkrs) 0.081 0.113* 0.000 0.083 -0.151 -0.122 0.148 0.030
(0.076) (0.067) (0.074) (0.081) (0.185) (0.179) (0.166) (0.184)
NES93 Manuf Non Manuf
Meeting (% wkrs) -0.000 0.042 0.035 0.036 0.016 0.121** 0.050 0.100
(0.050) (0.052) (0.062) (0.091) (0.073) (0.061) (0.070) (0.129)
Team (% wkrs) 0.031 -0.028 -0.107 0.026 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.011
(0.087) (0.064) (0.109) (0.124) (0.159) (0.162) (0.147) (0.200)
Job Rotation (% wkrs) 0.105 0.068 0.021 -0.112 0.193 0.047 0.212 0.221
(0.082) (0.057) (0.087) (0.139) (0.142) (0.171) (0.233) (0.238)
a-The estimation also includes variables describing technology and workforce characteristics, industry and
ﬁrm-size dummies. Standard errors computed using bootstrapping. 1% signiﬁcance level: ***.
5% signiﬁcance level: **. 10% signiﬁcance level: *.
b-Quantile regression based on the 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of the distribution of manager to production
workers wage ratios.
30Appendix A.1: Percentage of Employee Involvement by Practice Dummy
This appendix discusses the deﬁnition of employee involvement practices adoption based on the percentage
of workers under the given practice. The table below computes average percentages of workers under each of
the bundles of employee involvement practices. One can see that the average percentages vary a lot from across
practices, whether they are considered individually as combinations. They vary between 15 and 70% in 1993 and
between 6 and 80% in 1996. Job rotation is the practice that hardly reaches 50% of workers. Therefore, letting
the deﬁnition of the adoption start at a percentage of workers higher than 1% leads to the question of which
ideal percentage should apply. Moreover, choosing any percentage higher than 25% implies that teamwork and
job rotation cannot be analyzed as individual practices. To avoid this problem, I kept the 1% deﬁnition in the
remaining of the paper.
Practices Meeting Meeting Team
Meeting Team Job Rot. & & & All
Team Job Rot. Job Rot.
Year 1993
Sector Manuf.
% Meet. 46.75 0 0 54.97 49.41 0 56.82
(3.55) (5.05) (4.17) (3.81)
% Team 0 15.16 0 43.80 0 33.74 37.44
(8.28) (4.36) (11.65) (2.91)
% Job Rot. 0 0 36.59 0 34.31 24.35 49.56
(9.66) (3.36) (6.04) (3.65)
N 116 2 14 62 91 10 103
Sector Non Man.
% Meet. 71.02 0 0 74.62 43.08 0 59.82
(3.37) (4.41) (4.35) (4.72)
% Team 0 55.01 0 37.73 0 39.16 35.75
(21.28) (4.09) (17.66) (3.35)
% Job Rot. 0 0 19.31 0 31.34 24.32 25.11
(5.96) (3.43) (12.54) (3.11)
N 107 3 13 49 65 4 73
Year 1996
Sector Manuf.
% Meet. 60.30 0 0 59.06 67.89 0 55.10
(3.97) (3.97) (3.58) (2.82)
% Team 0 6.39 0 35.07 0.00 79.49 47.71
(0.60) (3.04) (11.17) (2.77)
% Job Rot. 0 0 44.76 0 47.19 27.97 45.22
(12.57) (3.02) (8.14) (2.60)
N 84 7 9 78 112 7 160
Sector Non Man.
% Meet. 77.29 0 0 77.52 82.69 0 76.45
(3.40) (5.40) (3.56) (3.27)
% Team 0 70.51 0 53.01 0 28.65 38.10
(16.05) (5.01) (2.63) (3.24)
% Job Rot. 0 0 21.76 0 38.27 27.94 40.75
(4.77) (3.79) (3.17) (3.77)
N8 0 6 9 4 5 7 6 4 8 2
31Appendix A.2: Wagea Dispersion and Experience - March CPS 1993 and 1996
In this appendix I analyze whether the lack of control for managers and production workers’ average experience
modiﬁes the cross-establishment variations in wage diﬀerentials. To do so, I used the March CPS for the year
1993 and 1996 in which there is information on workers’ education and age to construct potential experience and
information on the company size. To characterize variations in managers-production workers wage diﬀerentials,
I used information on ﬁrm size and industry of the workers. In the March CPS, ﬁrm size is a discrete variable
that takes 6 values from ﬁrms with less than 10 employees to ﬁrms with more than 1000 employees. I classiﬁed
industries according to the same method as in the NES, with 20 diﬀerent industries. I next selected individuals
reporting managerial occupations and deﬁned as production or front-line workers anyone reporting a profession
directly linked to the ﬁrm’s production. I estimated the wage diﬀerentials by regressing the log of hourly wages
on a dummy for managerial occupations. The cross-establishment variations in wage diﬀerentials are deﬁned by
interacting the manager dummy to dummies deﬁning the interaction of size and industry.
The table below presents the results of the estimations. Four series of regressions have been performed: an
estimation of the raw wage diﬀerentials (column (1)), a regression with the inclusion of workers controls such
as gender, race and union status (column (2)), a regression where education is added as an additional control
(column (3)), a regression where experience and experience squared are added as additional controls (column(4)).
Manager/Prod. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage Diﬀ.als No Controls + Fem, Mino, Union (2) + Educ. (2) + Exp.
1993
Manuf*Large 0.709 0.773 0.635 0.718
(0.046) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043)
Manuf*Medium 0.811 0.849 0.670 0.766
(0.081) (0.077) (0.074) (0.075)
Manuf*Small 0.760 0.760 0.600 0.693
(0.070) (0.067) (0.064) (0.064)
Non Manuf*Large 0.377 0.419 0.349 0.391
(0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030)
Non Manuf*Medium 0.411 0.415 0.347 0.377
(0.053) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049)
Non Manuf*Small 0.399 0.456 0.365 0.403
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
F-Testb (p-value) 128.6 (0.000) 157.2 (0.000) 107.2 (0.000) 139.1 (0.000)
1996
Manuf*Large 0.729 0.800 0.640 0.737
(0.055) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052)
Manuf*Medium 0.692 0.720 0.567 0.699
(0.093) (0.090) (0.086) (0.086)
Manuf*Small 0.725 0.796 0.629 0.748
(0.089) (0.085) (0.082) (0.082)
Non Manuf*Large 0.480 0.512 0.425 0.477
(0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Non Manuf*Medium 0.508 0.519 0.413 0.509
(0.064) (0.061) (0.059) (0.059)
Non Manuf*Small 0.410 0.437 0.335 0.399
(0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038)




F-Testb (p-value) 16.4 (0.000) 15.7 (0.000) 11.2 (0.000) 14.5 (0.000)
1996
F-Testb (p-value) 12.5 (0.000) 11.9 (0.000) 8.3 (0.000) 11.3 (0.000)
32a-Based on a sample of 5423 observations for 1993 and 3828 for 1996. Individual hourly
wages for managers and production workers. Base category is front-line in small manu-
facturing ﬁrms.
b-Test of joint equality of coeﬃcients.
The idea is to see whether cross- establishment variations approximated by cross-”industry*size” variations
in the diﬀerentials is aﬀected by the inclusion of the experience variables. To test that point, a F-test for the
joint equality of the wage diﬀerentials is performed.
Inter-establishment variations in wage diﬀerentials have been approximated ﬁrst in a large way by interacting
dummies for manufacturing and non manufacturing ﬁrms and for large (more than 500 employees), medium
(between 100 and 500 employees) and small ﬁrms. The last part of the table show the results of the estimations
with a more detailed division of industries and ﬁrm size. More precisely, 6 diﬀerent types of ﬁrm size are interacted
with 20 diﬀerent types of industries. The results show the F-test from the regressions.
Looking at the estimated wage diﬀerentials in the ﬁrst estimations with a large deﬁnition of establishment,
one can see a clear drop in the coeﬃcients when education is added to the speciﬁcation (2). The drop is much
weaker when experience is added to speciﬁcation (2). Experience has an impact on the manager-production
workers wage diﬀerentials but the question is whether the eﬀect is similar across establishments. An F-test for
the joint equality of the diﬀerentials across manufacturing and non manufacturing large, medium and small ﬁrms
show that including experience does not eliminate the variations in wage diﬀerentials (the test reject the null
of equality of the wage diﬀerentials). With a ﬁner characterization of establishments (bottom of the table), one
arrives to the same conclusions.
In summary, manager-production-worker wage dispersion within establishments does not seem to be strongly
modiﬁed when controlling for experience. In addition, the variations across establishments are better explained
by education than experience.
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Year NES 1993 NES 1996
System No EI Partial Full No EI Partial Full
Workforce
Education
Managers 14.20 15.11 15.31 14.35 14.70 15.12
(0.21) (0.07) (0.11) (0.25) (0.07) (0.10)
Front-line 11.84 12.11 12.24 11.98 12.26 12.90
(0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10)
Composition
% Women 26.06 43.49 38.32 31.89 36.21 42.52
(2.73) (1.27) (1.83) (3.74) (1.15) (1.46)
% Minorities 13.31 23.31 21.92 20.33 21.99 21.38
(2.78) (1.05) (1.62) (2.78) (1.01) (1.39)
% New Hired 19.32 24.62 27.46 10.01 17.58 17.65
(1.56) (1.05) (1.80) (1.22) (0.69) (0.77)
% Managers 14.72 10.39 9.95 10.89 13.19 11.68
(1.05) (0.32) (0.61) (0.92) (0.51) (0.49)
% Front-lines 59.17 65.65 66.34 58.66 57.06 53.12
(2.26) (1.00) (1.81) (2.78) (1.00) (1.53)
Pay
Wages
Managers (in log) 2.88 2.81 2.85 3.20 2.99 3.15
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)
Front-lines (in log) 2.35 2.16 2.18 2.45 2.38 2.40
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Log of the ratio 0.48 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.73
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Incentive pay
Prof. Sha. or Stck opt. 0.72 0.72 0.90 0.42 0.43 0.50
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03)
Prof. Sharing (1993) 0.04 0.15 0.33
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Stck. Option (1993) 0.52 0.45 0.58
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04)




% Ft-lines Meetings 54.84 69.07 66.30 64.57
(1.77) (2.77) (1.70) (2.18)
% Ft-lines Team 7.77 31.45 13.24 42.86
0.89) (2.21) (1.24) (1.87)
% Ft-lines Job Rotation 11.80 25.91 13.39 30.79
(1.07) (2.15) (1.11) (1.51)
Training
Training Team-Meetings (Ft-lines) 0.51 0.73 0.68 0.89
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Training Team-Meetings (Mngers) (1996) 0.83 0.81
(0.01) (0.02)
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(Continued)
Year NES 1993 NES 1996
System No EI Partial Full No EI Partial Full
Firm
Technology
Sales ($Millions) 9.96 36.34 27.73 23.05 20.75 20.36
(4.61) (6.37) (7.89) (8.65) (4.92) (3.50)
Capital ($Millions) 9.04 6.57 6.53 6.96 11.37 6.90
(5.81) (1.37) (2.23) (4.56) (7.94) (2.19)
Labor ($Millions) 2.76 4.04 5.12 3.00 3.53 3.48
(0.84) (0.65) (1.76) (1.31) (0.49) (0.65)
New Eqpt ($Millions) 0.29 1.12 0.56 0.94 0.53 0.71
(0.16) (0.19) (0.21) (0.78) (0.14) (0.19)
Other Costs ($Millions) 6.33 9.35 11.52 15.81 12.24 11.07
(1.39) (1.31) (2.96) (5.15) (1.91) (1.68)
% < 1 yr 14.49 15.83 9.78 10.04 17.84 10.39
(1.72) (0.96) (0.65) (1.38) (1.13) (0.60)
% 1-4 yr 35.22 32.60 40.10 33.76 34.64 42.02
(2.91) (0.99) (2.18) (2.78) (1.23) (1.33)
% 5-10 yr 23.76 35.65 35.34 32.81 29.90 36.35
(2.03) (1.04) (2.11) (3.38) (1.16) (1.19)
% > 11 yr 26.52 16.43 14.93 22.88 17.30 11.03
(4.49) (1.10) (1.77) (3.71) (1.10) (1.23)
Other
% Unionized 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.09
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02)
% Manuf 0.45 0.31 0.26 0.32 0.27 0.31
(0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)
Workplace
# Mng Levels 2.12 1.89 2.62 1.52 1.69 1.92
(0.16) (0.07) (0.12) (0.19) (0.12) (0.10)
# Wkrs Superv. 12.15 14.64 18.95 10.65 11.49 15.09
(1.65) (0.56) (2.41) (0.96) (0.47) (0.92)
% Benchmarking 0.05 0.26 0.46 0.19 0.28 0.44
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
% TQM 0.09 0.34 0.52 0.10 0.28 0.35
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
% Mngers using PC 69.48 73.48 77.28 78.70 77.83 87.97
(4.58) (1.52) (2.18) (3.92) (1.51) (1.48)
% Other using PC 20.14 42.09 44.30 59.52 53.69 68.31
(3.09) (1.66) (2.67) (5.75) (1.77) (2.09)
N 64 553 194 53 543 265
System Frequencies 7.89 68.19 23.92 6.15 63.06 30.77
35